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Equal Pay for Women Can Become a Reality:
A Proposal for Enactment of the Paycheck
Fairness Act
“I believe we have a moral obligation to ensure that one
half of the American workforce is treated fairly and equitably as the other half.”1 – Rosa L. DeLauro
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INTRODUCTION

Efforts to eradicate wage disparity between men and women began as
early as 1898 during the era of industrialization.2 The goal of equal pay for
equal work became more apparent during World War I.3 The National War
Labor Board of World War I established principles that recognized that it
was “necessary to employ women in work ordinarily performed by men,
[and] they must be allowed equal pay for equal work.”4 Another major occurrence that encouraged equal pay for women transpired during World
War II.5 The National War Labor Board of World War II created an equal
pay order.6 The war ended before the rule was enforced, but it led to the
next major impetus for equal pay for women: the Women’s Equal Pay Act
of 1945.7 This was the first bill that prohibited pay discrimination against
women.8 The bill did not succeed, but efforts to pass legislation that promoted equal pay continued in Congress.9 Between 1948 and 1962, seventytwo bills concerning equal pay were introduced to Congress.10 Not one bill
was exposed to a congressional hearing, and, furthermore, “no bill was reported.”11
Finally, in 1963, the Equal Pay Act (EPA) was enacted amending the
Fair Labor Standards Act.12 The EPA established that wage discrimination
based on sex is a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.13 In 1963,
women were paid 58.9% of what men made.14 In contrast, in 2011, women
were paid 77% of what men made.15 While the wage gap between men and

2.
EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK: FEDERAL EQUAL PAY LAW OF 1963 at 3 (Bureau
of Nat’l Affairs, Inc. et al. eds., 1963), available at
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.beal/eqpwol0001&id=1&collection=leghis&in
dex=alpha/E_leghis.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
History of the Struggle for Fair Pay, NAT’L COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY,
http://www.pay-equity.org/info-history.html (last updated Sept. 2012).
8.
EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK: FEDERAL EQUAL PAY LAW OF 1963, supra note
2, at 4.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
H.R. REP. NO. 88-309 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 687-88,
1963 WL 4623.
13.
Id.
14.
The Wage Gap Over Time: In Real Dollars, Women See a Continuing Gap,
NAT’L COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, http://www.pay-equity.org/info-time.html (last updated
Sept. 2012).
15.
Id.

2013]

EQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN

223

women has narrowed, it is still present.16 Over one hundred years have
passed since the quest for equal pay for women began.17 The pursuit to
completely eliminate the pay gap continues today in Congress, but despite
these efforts, the wage gap may exist for many years due to the continued
opposition confronting legislative remedial efforts.
In 1997, the Paycheck Fairness Act (PFA) was introduced in Congress.18 According to Rosa DeLauro, who introduced the PFA to the United
States House of Representatives,19 the PFA is a “common-sense solution to
the lingering problem of pay inequity.”20 Moreover, the purpose of the PFA
is to strengthen the EPA.21 Despite the fact that the PFA is a “common
sense solution” and would ultimately strengthen the EPA, a hearing for the
PFA did not occur until January 2009.22 The bill passed in the United States
House of Representatives (House) in January 2009,23 but the United States
Senate (Senate) failed to ratify the bill in November 2010.24 In June 2012,
history repeated itself when the PFA again was unsuccessful in the Senate.25 Despite the persistent wage gap, Congress has failed to acknowledge
that the EPA is ineffective for women to prevail on wage discrimination
claims, and Congress will not take the affirmative action to resolve the current wage inequity between men and women.26
In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a wage discrimination claim under
the EPA, she must plead and prove that: (1) “the employer pays different
wages to employees of opposite sex”; (2) “the employees perform equal
work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility”; and (3) they
“are performed under similar working conditions.”27 If the plaintiff is able
16.
Id.
17.
See EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK: FEDERAL EQUAL PAY LAW OF 1963, supra
note 2, at 3.
18.
History of the Struggle for Fair Pay, supra note 7.
19.
Id.
20.
Testimony of Rosa DeLauro, supra note 1, at 14.
21.
See id. at 13-14 (explaining that the EPA is not producing the results Congress
intended and that the PFA would provide “real progress” in the workforce).
22.
See 155 CONG. REC. H124 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009).
23.
Help Close the Wage Gap: Support the Paycheck Fairness Act, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/pfa_-_factsheet_1_2013.pdf.
24.
Amanda Terkel, Republicans Block an Up-or-Down Vote on the Paycheck
Fairness Act, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/17/republicans-block-paycheck-fairnessact_n_784849.html.
25.
Jennifer Bendery, Paycheck Fairness Act Fails the Senate Vote, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 5, 2012, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/05/paycheckfairness-act-senate-vote_n_1571413.html.
26.
See id.
27.
Peter Avery, Note, The Diluted Equal Pay Act: How Was it Broken? How Can
it Be Fixed?, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851 (2004). See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to prove her case, then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.28 The
employer defendant can raise four affirmative defenses.29 The employer can
prove that the wage differentials are based on: “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex.”30
In addition to the plaintiff’s prima facie case, there is also an establishment provision in the EPA.31 Specifically, the EPA provides that no
employer can discriminate “within any establishment in which such employees are employed.”32 The establishment requirement is known as the
“same establishment” provision.33 To prove a wage discrimination case
under the EPA, a plaintiff has to compare her wages to another employee
within the same establishment.34 If a court determines that the plaintiff is
trying to compare her wages to an employee of a separate establishment,
then the plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements of a prima facie case.35
Last, “[u]nlike normal class actions, plaintiffs in an Equal Pay Act suit
must affirmatively join the litigation.”36 Class actions under the EPA follow
the Fair Labor Standards Act.37 Plaintiffs must “opt-in” to the class action
in order to join the litigation.38 Most class actions are governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which provides for an “opt-out” procedure.39
Almost fifty years after the EPA’s enactment, the wage gap continues
to affect women on a national basis.40 The purpose of this Legislative Note
is to show that the EPA is not effective legislation for plaintiffs who fall
victim to wage discrimination. It demonstrates that the amendments of the
PFA would significantly change how courts handle wage discrimination
cases brought under the EPA. This Legislative Note examines three
amendments from the PFA. The first amendment analyzed alters the EPA’s
28.
See EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK: FEDERAL EQUAL PAY LAW OF 1963, supra
note 2, at 29.
29.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
See Deborah L. Brake, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, United States Senate: The Failure of Existing Employment
Laws to Close the Gender Wage Gap (Mar. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/brake.pdf.
34.
Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994).
35.
See Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 565 (D. Minn. 1983).
36.
Beavers v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d 792, 801 (11th Cir. 1992).
37.
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
38.
Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
39.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). See Beavers, 975 F.2d at 801; Shushan v. Univ. Colo. at
Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D. Colo. 1990).
40.
The Wage Gap Over Time, supra note 14.
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“any other factor other than sex” defense. The amendment dramatically
modifies the EPA’s “other factor” defense by specifying that an employer
meets his burden of proof if the justification for the wage disparity “(i) is
not based upon or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation;
(ii) is job-related with respect to the position in question; and (iii) is consistent with business necessity.”41 Next, this Legislative Note examines the
PFA’s amendment to the EPA’s “establishment” provision. Specifically, the
PFA amends the EPA by clarifying and defining the term “establishment.”42
Last, this Legislative Note analyzes the PFA’s class action amendment. The
PFA class action amendment would permit plaintiffs to bring their claims
as a class under a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class action rather
than a collective action required under the EPA.43
This Legislative Note begins its analysis in Part II by examining the
legislative histories of the Equal Pay Act and the Paycheck Fairness Act. It
demonstrates that both congressional bodies intended to eliminate the wage
gap.44 Part II of this Legislative Note also illustrates current statistics concerning the wage gap. It shows what women currently earn compared to
men and how the wage gap dramatically affects a woman’s earnings over a
working lifetime.45
Part III of this Legislative Note focuses on the amendment to the
EPA’s fourth affirmative defense—the “any other factor other than sex”
defense. It argues that the language of the PFA would not only resolve a
split circuit issue concerning how a defendant fulfills his burden of proof,46
but it also protects future EPA plaintiffs from unfounded defenses employers use to mask discrimination.47 The unambiguous language of the PFA
amendment would place a higher burden of proof on the defendant.48 However, the most significant aspect of this amendment is that it compels courts
and defendants to justify wage disparity between employees of the opposite

41.
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3220 (Westlaw).
42.
Id.
43.
Id. See Kuhn v. Phila. Elec. Co., 475 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (explaining that a plaintiff must bring an EPA collective action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
44.
See infra text accompanying notes 55-105.
45.
See infra text accompanying notes 106-116.
46.
See infra text accompanying notes 132-159. See also Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist.
v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965 (1992) (explaining the different standards courts utilize to interpret
the fourth affirmative defense).
47.
See infra text accompanying notes 174-177. See also Kouba v. Allstate, Ins.
Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
48.
See infra text accompanying notes 160-183; Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220,
112th Cong. § 3(a) (2012), 2011 CONG US S 3220 (Westlaw).
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sex based on factors like training, education, and skill, rather than a factor
concerning one’s sex.49
Part IV of this Legislative Note focuses on the “establishment” portion
of the EPA and the amendment proposed by the PFA. It argues that the
language of the PFA supports a broad interpretation of the term “establishment,” and, by doing so, allows a plaintiff to successfully plead her case.50
This Legislative Note argues that the “establishment” amendment would
eliminate the result that a plaintiff’s case is dismissed solely because she
works at another location, and it illustrates that the amendment promotes
the basic purposes of the EPA.51
Last, Part V of this Legislative Note discusses the PFA “class action”
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. It shows that the PFA amendment better serves plaintiffs if they are permitted to bring a class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23), as opposed to a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (section 216(b)).52 Specifically, Rule
23 permits and encourages a higher participation class rate and grants procedural protections that section 216(b) fails to provide.53 Overall, by analyzing certain amendments from the PFA, this Legislative Note demonstrates that the PFA would have a significant impact on wage discrimination claims: it would create uniformity among courts, better protect EPA
plaintiffs, serve the true remedial purposes of the EPA, and close the wage
gap between men and women.
II.
A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND THE
PAYCHECK FAIRNESS ACT

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT

“[E]qual pay for equal work.”54 This was the theme of Congress when
the EPA was passed.55 Interestingly, Congress recognized that the legisla49.
See infra text accompanying notes 174-183. See also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent.
Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992).
50.
See infra text accompanying notes 232-267.
51.
See infra text accompanying notes 253-287. See also Grumbine v. United
States, 586 F. Supp. 1144, 1151 (D.D.C. 1984).
52.
See infra text accompanying notes 304-357.
53.
See infra text accompanying notes 304-345; Kennedy v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., No. 7-08-cv-00579, 2010 WL 3743642, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2010). See
also Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D. Colo. 1990).
54.
See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 (AMENDING SECTION
6 OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS OF 1938, AS AMENDED): PUBLIC LAW 88-38, 88TH
CONGRESS, H.R. 6060 AND S. 1409, at 56 (1963), available at
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.leghis/equalpay0001&id=1&collection=leghis
&index=alpha/L_leghis.
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tion was long overdue and there had to be economic justice for women.56
Congress intended to combat the old-fashioned belief that a man could be
paid more than a woman due to his standing in society.57 By doing so, Congress wanted to eliminate the wage gap between men and women.58 There
were three significant reasons why the EPA was enacted.59 First, discriminatory pay rates negatively affected the general “purchasing power and
living standard” of employees.60 Second, employers who engaged in discriminatory pay had an unfair benefit over those who did pay men and
women equally.61 Last, Congress was concerned that low levels of production could result from a lack of morale due to low wages.62
Examining the defenses for employers, Congress recognized that it
was not possible for the EPA to provide every exception in order to defeat a
plaintiff’s case.63 Because of this, Congress granted employers three definitive exceptions and one broad exception.64 As introduced above, the broad
exception is the fourth affirmative defense: the “any other factor other than
sex” defense.65 Even though this defense was intended to be broad, Congress recognized the defense was to be business related.66 The fourth affirmative defense would permit employers to raise issues such as: “shift
differentials, restrictions on or differences based on time of day worked,
hours of work, lifting or moving heavy objects, [or] differences based on
experience, training, or ability.”67 Clearly, the intent of Congress concerning the fourth affirmative defense was to be business-related.68 Anything
similar to the valid, business-related reasons illustrated above permitted an
employer to pay employees differently without violating the Act.69
55.
See H.R. REP. NO. 88-309 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 688,
1963 WL 4623.
56.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, supra note 54, at 57.
57.
Id. at 36.
58.
Id. at 39.
59.
Id. at 36.
60.
Id.
61.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, supra note 54, at 37.
62.
Id.
63.
H.R. REP. NO. 88-309 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689, 1963
WL 4623.
64.
Id.
65.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
66.
See H.R. REP. NO. 88-309 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 1963
WL 4623.
67.
Id. at 689.
68.
See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992).
69.
See id. (examining the legislative history of the fourth affirmative defense, and
based on that analysis, the court concluded that an employer’s defense of a job classification
system needed to be “rooted” in a business-related reason in order for the court to find that
the employer did not violate the EPA).
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Concerning the opponents of the EPA, there is no direct evidence that
congressional members opposed the proposition “equal pay for equal
work.”70 Those who did in fact oppose the Act concentrated on how costly
it was to hire women employees.71 Others argued that the EPA would permit the federal government to become too involved in local affairs and
businesses.72 Specifically, opposing congressional members believed the
EPA encouraged the federal government to explore employers’ files, an
unnecessary act that did not concern the salary of women employees.73
Some congressional members argued that discriminatory pay in the workplace was an issue that should be addressed by state governments, not the
federal government.74 Whatever opposition the EPA encountered, it is significant that members of Congress who objected to the Act did not oppose
the EPA because it sought to establish equal pay for equal work and an
elimination of the wage gap.75
The overall intent of Congress was to abolish the economic injustice in
society.76 Congress not only focused on how the EPA would impact women, but also how the Act affected society as a whole.77 Specifically, Congress recognized that the Act would have a momentous effect on almost 25
million women.78
B.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PAYCHECK FAIRNESS ACT

“Equal pay for equal work must not just be a saying, it must be the
law.”79 The primary intent of Congress concerning the PFA was to lessen
the wage gap, and fill the “loopholes” that had developed in case law due to
the EPA.80 Congressional proponents wanted to repair and strengthen the
EPA.81 Those in support of the PFA truly believed the proposed legislation
70.
EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK: FEDERAL EQUAL PAY LAW OF 1963, supra note
2, at 7.
71.
Id.
72.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, supra note 54, at 71-72.
73.
EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK: FEDERAL EQUAL PAY LAW OF 1963, supra note
2, at 7.
74.
Id.
75.
See id.
76.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, supra note 54, at 53-55,
57-58.
77.
See id.
78.
Id. at 53.
79.
155 CONG. REC. H129 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Holt).
80.
Testimony of Rosa DeLauro, supra note 1, at 1. See also 155 CONG. REC. H127
(daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Miller).
81.
Testimony of Rosa DeLauro, supra note 1, at 1. See generally 155 CONG. REC.
H127-H133 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (demonstrating statements made by congressional members that the EPA is not an effective legal tool for women, given the current wage gap and
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was a real solution to a current societal dilemma.82 “We have a chance to
finally provide equal pay for equal work and make opportunity real for millions of American women.”83
When the House of Representatives considered the PFA in debate,
members were not just focusing on what women made in comparison to
men, but how the pay differential affected women’s economic lives.84 For
example, Congressman Hare of Illinois stated “[t]his wage disparity will
end up costing women anywhere from $400,000 to $2 million over a lifetime in lost wages.”85 In addition, Congress focused on how wage discrimination affects the family unit.86 Many American households depend on two
wage earners, and when one wage earner does not receive the full benefit of
her paycheck, the entire family is affected.87 In addition, some members of
Congress promoted the passage of the PFA by analyzing the progress of the
wage gap since the enactment of the EPA.88 After more than forty years
since passage of the EPA, the “progress” is that women earn 77 cents for
every dollar earned by men, compared to the 59 cents women made for
every dollar earned by men when the EPA was enacted.89
Supporters of the PFA believed that the proposed legislation would
improve the wage gap.90 For example, the PFA would deter wage discrimination because it would impose consequential penalties.91 In addition, a no
retaliation clause in the legislation protects the employee in the event she
shares wage and salary information with other employees.92 Lastly, those in
favor of the PFA believed the bill would discourage employers from using
numerous reasons to justify a difference in pay between a male and female
employee.93 Thus, members of Congress stressed that an employer’s defense should not be connected in any way to one’s sex.94 When congressional members addressed the fourth affirmative defense, paralleling the
certain “loopholes” that have developed in the law, and that the PFA would actually repair
the current state of the law).
82.
See 155 CONG. REC. H129 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. DeLauro).
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
155 CONG. REC. H129 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Hare).
86.
155 CONG. REC. H130 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Holt).
87.
See Id.;155 CONG. REC. H130 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Slaughter).
88.
155 CONG. REC. H130 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Slaughter).
89.
Id.
90.
See generally 155 CONG. REC. H131-H133 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (demonstrating statements made by congressional members in support of the PFA because of the likelihood the legislation will improve the wage gap).
91.
155 CONG. REC. H131 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee).
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
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congressional intent concerning the EPA, they too intended for the fourth
affirmative defense to be “job-related” and “necessary for the business.”95
In contrast to those who supported the PFA, members of Congress
who were against the PFA claimed it made the system “fundamentally unfair.”96 These members of Congress concentrated on how the legislation
would affect independent businesses and employers.97 Congressional members opposing the legislation argued that if the PFA were enacted, it would
hamper the nation’s businesses.98 They explained that this legislation would
limit the control of business owners when hiring employees.99 More specifically, they believed the PFA would permit Congress to actually manage the
employment matters of independent businesses.100 In addition, if the legislation was enacted, they assumed employers would be unprotected from an
indefinite amount of claims.101 Last, those against the passage of the PFA
believed that it would eliminate “key employer defenses.”102
Those who opposed the PFA indicated that the proposed legislation
would increase the costs of lawsuits and benefit trial lawyers.103 One member of Congress went as far to say that “[t]he Democrats’ meager efforts to
blunt the potential harm do not change the fact that trial lawyers stand to
receive a big payday . . . .”104 Despite the opposition to the bill, these members of Congress acknowledged that any wage disparity between men and
women due to sexual discrimination is a wrongdoing.105
Overall, the legislative history of the Paycheck Fairness Act illustrates
that the congressional members today have the same goal as the congressional members in 1962: to eliminate the wage gap between men and women. Despite the fact that these two congressional bodies had the same intent,
the wage gap persists.
C.

STATISTICS CONCERNING THE WAGE GAP

The statistics are clear: the wage gap between women and men has not
been eliminated.106 The following statistics provide an accurate picture of
earnings between men and women. The statistics are based on the earnings
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

155 CONG. REC. H133 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
155 CONG. REC. H132 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. McKeon).
Id.
155 CONG. REC. H128 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kline).
Id.
Id.
Id.
155 CONG. REC. H128 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Andrews).
155 CONG. REC. H128 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kline).
155 CONG. REC. H132 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. McKeon).
155 CONG. REC. H128 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kline).
See The Wage Gap Over Time, supra note 14.
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of a full-time, year-round worker.107 A “full-time” worker is someone who
worked “[thirty-five] or more hours per week in the weeks they worked in
the past [twelve] months.”108 A “year-round” worker is an individual who
worked “[fifty] or more weeks in the past [twelve] months.”109 According
to the American Community Survey, in 2009, for full-time, year-round
workers, the “median earnings for women were 78.2% of men’s earnings;”110 thus, in 2009, a woman’s average salary was $35,549, and a man’s
average salary was $45,485.111 Moreover, in all fifty states and the District
of Columbia, women earned less than men.112
As indicated above, in 1963, the wage disparity between men and
women was that a woman was paid 59 cents for every dollar a man earned,
and, currently, a woman is paid approximately 77 to 78 cents for every dollar a man earns.113 This increase illustrates that the “wage gap has narrowed
by less than half a cent per year.”114 Overall, it is estimated that if a woman
worked full-time for forty-seven years, she lost a substantial amount of
earnings due to the wage gap.115 The following illustrates the dramatic loss
of earnings a woman can sustain over a working lifetime due to the wage
gap: a high school graduate can lose $700,000; a college graduate can lose
$1.2 million; and a professional school graduate can lose $2 million.116
There are sources that address and demonstrate that there are additional reasons for the wage disparity between men and women.117 These additional reasons are categorized as “women’s choices.”118 Among these
107.
David M. Getz, Men’s and Women’s Earnings for States and Metropolitan
Statistical Areas: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Sept. 2010, available at
https://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbr09-3.pdf.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Getz, supra note 107.
113.
The Wage Gap Over Time, supra note 14; See Getz, supra note 107.
114.
The Wage Gap Over Time, supra note 14
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
See CONSAD RESEARCH CORP., AN ANALYSIS OF REASONS FOR THE DISPARITY
IN WAGES BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN (2009), available at
http://www.consad.com/content/reports/Gender%20Wage%20Gap%20Final%20Report.pdf;
Ramesh Ponnuru, Don’t Blame Discrimination for Gender Wage Gap, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
13, 2012, 5:30 PM CT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-13/don-t-blamediscrimination-for-gender-wage-gap.html. A detailed explanation concerning the causes of
the wage disparity between men and women is beyond the scope of this Legislative Note.
The purpose of this paragraph is to bring light to the differing explanations concerning the
wage disparity, yet establish that the pay gap between men and women cannot be “explained
away.” AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAY GAP 8 (2012),
available at http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/The-Simple-Truth-2013.pdf.
118.
THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAY GAP, supra note 117, at 8.
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“choices” that cause wage disparity between women and men is the fact
that women, on average, work fewer hours than men.119 Another possible
reason for the wage disparity might be due to the fact that women and men
choose different occupational fields.120 In addition, the obvious “women’s
choice” that affects women’s pay is motherhood.121 Studies indicate that
when women become mothers, this typically results in these women leaving
the work force or working part-time.122 Despite these “women’s choices,”
sources indicate that after taking into consideration the “choices” that may
affect the wage disparity between men and women, there is still an unexplained wage gap between men and women.123
III.
A.

THE “ANY OTHER FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX” DEFENSE

PROPOSED LANGUAGE OF THE PAYCHECK FAIRNESS ACT

As previously described, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case
alleging that her employer pays employees of one sex more than employees
of the opposite sex for equal work, the burden shifts to the employer to
show that the differential is justified by one of the EPA’s four exceptions.124
The payment is justified if it is made pursuant to: “(i) a seniority system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other
than sex.”125 The exceptions are affirmative defenses, which the employer
must plead and prove.126 The fourth affirmative defense has the attention of
current members of Congress due to the ambiguous language and the varying interpretations of this exception.127
The proposed language of the PFA would have a substantial impact on
how courts interpret the fourth affirmative defense. The language of the
PFA is specific and instructive concerning when the employer’s “any factor
other than sex” defense satisfies the burden of proof.128 Specifically, the
119.
Ponnuru, supra note 117.
120.
CONSAD RESEARCH CORP., supra note 117, at 6; THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT
THE PAY GAP, supra note 117, at 8. The American Association of University of Women
recognizes that while the gender wage gap may be “explained” by the fact that women enter
occupational fields that tend to pay less, this does not mean the wages in those fields are
actually fair. THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAY GAP, supra note 117, at 8.
121.
THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE PAY GAP, supra note 117, at 9.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. at 8.
124.
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
125.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
126.
Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1982).
127.
See Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965 (1992).
128.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2012), 2011 CONG
US S 3220 (Westlaw).
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drafters of the PFA struck out “any other factor other than sex” and inserted
“a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience.”129 Not only do the drafters emphasize that the defendant’s “factor”
be a “bona fide factor” and provide examples of such a factor, but the drafters also explain that the employer’s exception applies when the employer
demonstrates that it is truly not a sex-based justification and that it is business related.130 Specifically, the drafters proposed this language to be inserted at the end of 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1): “The bona fide factor defense
described in subparagraph (A)(iv) shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that such factor (i) is not based upon or derived from a sex-based
differential in compensation; (ii) is job-related with respect to the position
in question; and (iii) is consistent with business necessity.”131 This Legislative Note demonstrates that if Congress adopted, or in the future adopts, the
PFA language, the interpretation of the fourth affirmative defense by the
courts would be consistent, it would create a higher burden of proof for the
defendant, and it would promote the original intent of Congress.
B.

SOLUTION FOR THE SPLIT CIRCUITS

The proposed language of the PFA would create and encourage uniformity among the circuits interpreting the “any other factor other than sex”
language of the EPA. Justices White, O’Connor, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist of the United States Supreme Court recognized that the circuit
courts relied on different standards to establish whether the employer meets
his burden of proof concerning the fourth affirmative defense.132 Specifically, the two main standards used by the courts to determine if the employer
has met his burden of proof are the gender-neutral test and the legitimate
business reason test.133
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits apply a gender neutrality standard to
determine if an employer can prevail on the “any other factor other than
sex” defense.134 These courts recognize and emphasize that the fourth af129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965 (1992).
133.
See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992)
(asserting that the defendant must provide a “legitimate business-related” reason to support
the wage disparity between a male and female employee); Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206,
1211 (7th Cir. 1989) (demonstrating that the gender-neutral test is a broad standard that does
not have to be related to the employee’s position); Peter Avery, Note, The Diluted Equal Pay
Act: How Was It Broken? How Can It Be Fixed?, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 864-66 (2004).
134.
See Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1206. See also Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317
(7th Cir. 1987); Strecker v. Grand Forks Cnty. Soc. Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1980),
overruled on other grounds by Robert v. Norton, 682 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1982).
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firmative defense was intended to be broad.135 The court in Fallon v. State
of Illinois stated that “[t]he fourth affirmative defense . . . (any other factor
other than sex) is a broad ‘catch-all’ exception and embraces an almost limitless number of factors, so long as they do not involve sex.”136 While these
circuits maintain that the exception must be broad, they require that the
factor may not be “discriminatorily applied.”137 In Covington v. Southern
Illinois University, the court stated that an employer could consider the prior salary of another employee as a “factor other than sex” if the payment
policy was not discriminatorily implemented or if there was no other evidence that illustrated the employer discriminated because of an individual’s
sex.138 Courts that apply this approach ignore that the employer’s “other
factor” defense relates to the requirements of the particular position being
litigated or even the company’s business.139
The proposed language of the PFA clearly disposes of the gender neutrality defense. While the gender-neutral circuits explicitly reject that the
other factor has to be related to business,140 the language of the PFA clearly
supports that an employer must prove that the “other factor” is both necessary for the business- and job-related.141 In essence, even if an employer
utilizes a gender-neutral standard, the proposed language of the PFA requires the employer to support his defense with something more.142 If the
PFA were enacted, the minority’s gender neutrality standard would violate
the statute. Courts of the minority view warn that imposing a businessrelated standard permits other courts to re-examine and possibly supervise a
company or business.143 In addition, the minority circuits recognize the
split, and are “not even slightly tempted to change sides.”144 These courts
argue that the gender-neutral standard directly supports the language of
section 206(d)(1) of the EPA.145 However, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
fail to consider the intent of Congress at the time the EPA was adopted.146

135.
See Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211.
136.
Id.
137.
Covington, 816 F.2d at 323.
138.
Id.
139.
See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., Ill., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005).
140.
Id.
141.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2012), 2011 CONG
US S 3220 (Westlaw).
142.
See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992)
(explaining that without a business- or job-related reason, the defense could not prove its
case with “a gender-neutral classification system”).
143.
Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2003).
144.
Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 470.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
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The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits (the majority view)
apply the “acceptable business reason” standard in order to determine
whether the employer prevails on the fourth affirmative defense.147 Under
this standard, the employer must give an acceptable business reason to justify the wage disparity.148 According to the court in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., the EPA “concerns business practices.”149 Therefore, it is “nonsensical to sanction the use of a factor that rests on some consideration unrelated to business.”150 In addition, the court in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. J.C. Penney Co., concluded that an employer could
prevail if he showed that the “factor other than sex” was “at a minimum” an
acceptable business reason.151 Furthermore, these circuits relied on legislative history in order to elaborate on the acceptable business reason standard.152 The court in Glenn v. General Motors Corp. specified that the fourth
affirmative defense of the EPA applied when the pay disparity is the product of “unique characteristics of the same job; from an individual’s experience, training, or ability; or from special exigent circumstances connected
with the business.”153
The proposed language of the PFA is unambiguous and clearly aligns
with the “acceptable business reason” standard.154 To reiterate, the language
requires that the “factor other than sex” be related to the job in question or
necessary for the business.155 If the PFA were enacted, it would set forth a
precedent that is already widespread among the circuits.156 In addition, the
courts applying the “acceptable business reason” standard were guided by
147.
See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992); Glenn v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v.
J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th
Cir. 1982).
148.
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
J.C. Penney, 843 F.2d at 253.
152.
Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525-26; Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571.
153.
Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571.
154.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2012), 2011 CONG
US S 3220 (Westlaw). See also Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes:
Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 229, 267 (2012) (maintaining that the majority view concerning the “other factor other than sex” is codified by the
PFA).
155.
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3220 (Westlaw).
156.
See generally Aldrich, 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992); Glenn, 841 F.2d 1567 (11th
Cir. 1988); J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988); Kouba v. Allstate, Ins. Co., 691
F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982) (demonstrating that the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
already implement the “acceptable business reason” standard when discerning whether the
employer has met his burden of proof concerning the fourth affirmative defense).
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the congressional intent of the EPA.157 The majority circuits relied on the
congressional records of the Senate and House to determine whether the
courts should consider the business-related standard when analyzing the
employer’s affirmative defense.158 These courts determined that Congress
intended that a business- or job-related standard apply to this defense because it is unjust to prevent a plaintiff from prevailing on a prima facie case
without investigating the specific characteristics of a certain job or business.159 Therefore, the PFA’s legislation would not only promote the view
of the majority circuits, but also reinforce the original intent of Congress.
C.

HIGHER BURDEN ON THE DEFENDANT

Again, the proposed language of the PFA alters the “any other factor
other than sex” language of the EPA.160 The PFA states that the employer’s
other factor would only prevail if it “(i) is not based upon or derived from a
sex-based differential in compensation; (ii) is job-related with respect to the
position in question; and (iii) is consistent with business necessity.”161 The
precise language set forth in the PFA concerning the “factor other than sex”
defense places a higher burden of proof on the defendant. Contrary to the
PFA, the ambiguous language set forth in the EPA concerning the fourth
affirmative defense has led courts to relax the defendant’s burden of
proof.162
In Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Service Board, the court
found that Betty Strecker “performed substantially equal work under similar working conditions” to her male successor yet received considerably
less pay.163 Even though Strecker successfully pleaded and proved her prima facie case, the court concluded that the pay differential was justified by
the state’s “classification system.”164 A classification system that calculates
a person’s experience and education with an occupation’s obligations in
order to establish an employee’s salary does not violate the EPA.165 However, when the court concluded that the classification itself is an acceptable

157.
See, e.g., Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571.
158.
Id. See also Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 526.
159.
See, e.g., Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525-26.
160.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2012), 2011 CONG
US S 3220 (Westlaw).
161.
Id.
162.
Peter Avery, Note, The Diluted Equal Pay Act: How Was It Broken? How Can
It Be Fixed?, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 865 (2004).
163.
Strecker v. Grand Forks Cnty. Soc. Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 99 (8th Cir. 1980),
overruled on other grounds by Robert v. Norton, 682 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1982).
164.
Strecker, 640 F.2d at 104.
165.
Id. at 100.
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factor other than sex, it diminished the burden of proof on the defendant.166
The dissent recognized “that the defendants did nothing more than establish
the existence of that system.”167 By relying on the ambiguous language of
the EPA and permitting the defendant to prevail on any factor as long as it
did not involve sex, the defendants did not have to show if the classification
system requirements were related to the job, if Strecker was not qualified
for a higher classification, or if she was receiving the highest possible salary she could earn.168
The PFA resolves the risk of diminishing the burden of proof on the
defendant by eliminating ambiguous language of the EPA. The proposed
language of the PFA places a higher burden on the defendant by eliminating
a common belief that the fourth affirmative defense truly includes any other
factor than sex.169 Courts that apply the gender neutrality standard interpret
the language of the fourth affirmative defense as embracing “an almost
limitless number of factors, so long as they do not involve sex.”170 The PFA
drafters purposely excluded “any” from section 206(d)(1), and replaced it
with “a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience.”171 The court in EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., ruled that the fourth affirmative defense “does not include literally any other factor.”172 Eliminating the idea that defendants are free to choose any defense, as long as it
does not involve sex, allows a plaintiff to have a stronger case.173
The PFA favors the business-related standard because it separates defenses that truly are justifiable reasons for a difference in pay from those
that actually discriminate.174 Courts rely on the business-related standard in
order to circumvent the facially neutral defenses offered by employers that,
in reality, discriminate based on sex.175 By enforcing a legitimate business
166.
See id. at 104 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
See Kouba v. Allstate, Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that if
a defendant uses “any factor that either does not refer on its face to an employee's gender or
does not result in all women having lower salaries than all men . . . an employer [can] easily
manipulate factors having a close correlation to gender as a guise to pay female employees
discriminatorily low salaries . . . ”).
170.
Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989).
171.
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3220 (Westlaw).
172.
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th
Cir. 1988).
173.
Cf. J.C. Penney, 843 F.2d at 253; Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876; Aldrich v. Randolph
Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992) (demonstrating that if courts permitted
employers to utilize any factor to satisfy the fourth affirmative defense, employers can then
easily mask sexual discrimination).
174.
See Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
175.
See, e.g., id.
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standard, the employer has to show that his excuse is legitimate or necessary for the business.176 “Without a job-relatedness requirement, the factor–
other-than-sex defense would provide a gaping loophole in the statute
through which many pretexts for discrimination would be sanctioned.”177
By requiring courts to analyze if the employer’s other factor relates to the
job or is necessary for the business, the PFA ensures that an employer cannot use a facially neutral defense and thus places a higher burden on the
defendant.
The PFA is also significant because it sets a precedent for the business
standard and ultimately gives more guidance to courts. Even a businessrelated defense could serve as a pretext for discrimination.178 For example,
an employer might argue that an employee’s prior salary is a legitimate
“factor other than sex” to determine her current salary.179 While this reason
has been accepted as a “factor other than sex,”180 courts that rely on the
business-related standard realize that the prior salary of one’s employment
may have been the result of discrimination as well.181 The courts are limited
when confronted with this type of defense, because there is no standard
precedent when applying the “acceptable business reason” standard,182 and
courts disagree on what constitutes a legitimate business reason.183 The
proposed language of the PFA would effectively guide courts when applying the business-related standard.
D.

MARKET FORCE THEORY ELIMINATED

As previously established, the PFA specifies that the employer’s
fourth affirmative defense should be “job-related with respect to the position in question,” and “consistent with business necessity.”184 In addition to
these two factors, the PFA also mandates that the employer’s fourth affirmative defense “is not based upon or derived from a sex-based [difference] in
176.
See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525. See also Maxwell v. City of Tucson, 803 F.2d
444, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1986).
177.
Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525.
178.
See Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
179.
Id.
180.
Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., Ill., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005).
181.
See Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
182.
See generally Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d
249, 255 (6th Cir. 1988) (Hillman, J., dissenting) (illustrating that the majority does not
provide any guidance when the “legitimate business reason . . . becomes a pretext for discrimination”); Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876 (asserting that there is no guidance concerning the
“proper judicial inquiry” when applying the business-related standard, and the court had to
manufacture its own test).
183.
See J.C. Penney, 843 F.2d at 255 (Hillman, J., dissenting).
184.
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(3) (2012), 2011 CONG US
S 3220 (Westlaw).
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compensation.”185 This clause is significant because it might bar employers
and courts from justifying the “factor other than sex” defense with the market force theory.186
The market force theory is the argument “that supply and demand dictates that women qua women may be paid less than their male counterparts”
for similar work.187 This theory supports employers paying male employees
more because the idea is that “male employees are in higher demand than
female employees.”188 Contrary to this theory is the comparable worth theory.189 The comparable worth theory is that wages should be the same when
occupations predominantly made up of women are “comparable” to the
occupations that are predominantly made up of men.190 The goal of the
comparable worth theory is to provide equal wages to employees in comparable occupations.191 By doing so, wages are based on an employee’s training, skill, work environment, and so on.192 The PFA’s language should, and
hopefully will, ban the use of a market force theory.193 In addition, the language of the PFA supports the holdings of the Supreme Court and the majority circuits: that the market force theory should not be the foundation of
an employer’s fourth affirmative defense because it supports wage discrimination based on sex.194
The PFA’s proposed language codifies and enforces the Supreme
Court’s rejection of the market force theory concerning the fourth affirma185.
Id.
186.
See generally Daniel N. Kuperstein, Note, Finding Worth in the New Workplace: The Implications of Comparable Worth’s Reemergence in the Global Economy, 24
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 363, 389 (2007) (stating that the PFA as a whole promotes the
comparable worth theory).
187.
Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir.
1988), quoted in Ruben Bolivar Pagan, Note, Defending the “Acceptable Business Reason”
Requirement of the Equal Pay Act: A Response to the Challenges of Wernsing v. Department of Human Services, 33 J. CORP. L. 1007, 1020 (2007).
188.
Thomas H. McCarthy, Jr., Note, “Market Value” as a Factor “Other Than Sex”
in Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Claims, U. ILL. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1985), cited in Pagan, supra note 187, at 1020.
189.
Pagan, supra note 187, at 1019.
190.
Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez, Comparable Worth, ISSUES IN ETHICS,
Spring 1990, available at http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v3n2/comparable.html.
191.
Kuperstein, supra note 186, at 376.
192.
Id.
193.
See generally id. at 389, 392 (explaining the PFA as a whole promotes the comparable worth theory).
194.
See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Glenn v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988). See generally Pagan, supra note 187, at
1020-21 (indicating that the Supreme Court did not adhere to the market force theory as a
justification for wage disparity and that the market force theory does not accurately establish
the value of an employee).
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tive defense.195 In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, Corning Glass Works
paid higher wages to night shift employees, but men predominantly filled
the night shift positions.196 The Court stated Corning would prevail on its
claim if it could prove that the difference in pay was compensation for
working night shifts, as opposed to higher pay due to the fact that men
dominated the night shift.197 The Court found that Corning did not prevail
on the fourth affirmative defense because when the difference of pay was in
place at Corning Glass Works, the remainder of night employees in that
specific industry did not receive higher wages than day employees.198 The
Court recognized that the difference in pay transpired because men did not
want to work for the lower wages women earned.199 The wage differential
“reflected a job market in which Corning could pay women less than men
for the same work.”200
The PFA’s language banning the use of the market force theory is significant because, despite the Supreme Court’s position that the market force
theory does not justify a difference in pay,201 courts still adhere to the theory to justify the “factor other than sex” defense.202 Circuits that apply the
acceptable business reason standard criticize the minority circuits that permit an employer’s defense to qualify as a factor other than sex based on the
market force theory.203 The court in Covington permitted a university to
justify a wage disparity between a male and female employee because of a
“salary retention policy.”204 The salary retention policy is a sex-neutral policy that sustained an employee’s salary when that employee’s occupational
position changed within the university.205 This sex-neutral university policy
did not relate to the business or the job requirements of an employee’s performance.206 The court “implicitly used the market force theory to justify
the pay disparity.”207 Recently, the court in Wernsing v. Department of Hu195.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2012), 2011 CONG
US S 3220 (Westlaw); Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 204-05 (1974); Pagan, supra note
187, at 1020 (maintaining that the Supreme Court refused to permit the market force theory
to justify wage disparity between male and female employees).
196.
Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 192.
197.
Id. at 204.
198.
Id. at 204-05.
199.
Id. at 205.
200.
Id.
201.
See Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 205; Pagan, supra note 187, at 1020.
202.
See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., Ill., 427 F.3d 466, 469-70 (7th Cir.
2005); Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1987); Pagan, supra note 187, at
1021.
203.
See Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988).
204.
Id.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
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man Services also disregarded the Supreme Court’s position concerning the
market force theory.208 The court stated “[t]he Equal Pay Act forbids sex
discrimination, an intentional wrong, while markets are impersonal and
have no intent.”209 Not only did the court dismiss the concerns rooted in the
market force theory, but it also refused to recognize the value of the comparable worth theory.210 The court in Wernsing acknowledged that the comparable worth doctrine sets “wages based on ‘merit’ rather than forces of supply and demand,” yet the court refused to apply the comparable worth doctrine.211
The reasoning set forth in Covington and Wernsing is what the PFA
clearly would eradicate. The application of the market force theory inherently discriminates on the basis of sex.212 The PFA’s language makes it
clear that any difference in compensation based on sex would not be tolerated as a justification for the wage disparity.213 The supporters of the PFA
seek to reinforce the Supreme Court’s stance on the market force theory,214
and, more importantly, legislate that women’s wages should be determined
by their training, skill, education, and so on, or as the court in Wernsing
called it: their “merit.”215
IV.
A.

THE ESTABLISHMENT PROVISION

THE “ESTABLISHMENT” PROVISION AND THE PAYCHECK FAIRNESS ACT
AMENDMENT

A plaintiff’s prima facie equal pay case requires her to prove that an
employer pays employees of the opposite sex different wages.216 In addition
to this initial requirement, the plaintiff must also comply with a “geographic
limitation” provided by the statute.217 The “employees against whom plaintiff compares herself [a comparator] must work in the same ‘establishment’
as the claimant.”218 Thus, a plaintiff completely pleads and proves her
“prima facie case by satisfying both the geographic and descriptive compo208.
Pagan, supra note 187, at 1021.
209.
Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 469.
210.
Id. at 469-70.
211.
Id.
212.
See generally Pagan, supra note 187, at 1020 (demonstrating that the market
force theory is an unpersuasive defense to wage disparity because the market analysis does
not accurately establish wages).
213.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3220 (Westlaw).
214.
See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974).
215.
Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 469.
216.
Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1994).
217.
Id.
218.
Id.
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nents of the test as applied to even one comparator.”219 The establishment
provision of the EPA is significant, because the determination of whether
there is a single establishment or separate establishments affects the outcome of the plaintiff’s case.220 Unfortunately, the language of the EPA is
silent concerning how courts should interpret “establishment.”221 “Establishment” is mentioned three times in the language of the statute.222 The
EPA states:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within
any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions . . . .223
While the EPA is silent concerning the term “establishment,” the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines the term.224
The term “establishment . . . refers to a distinct physical place of business
rather than to an entire business or ‘enterprise’ which may include several
separate places of business.”225 Therefore, the general rule states that each
physically separate place of business is usually a separate establishment.226
Despite the general rule, the EEOC acknowledges that under “unusual circumstances” a business can be regarded as a single establishment even
when segments of a business are physically separated.227 The EEOC provides examples to demonstrate when these “unusual circumstances” give
rise to a single establishment, such as: a central administrative entity that
establishes wages, hires employees, and assigns where employees work;
employees that transfer frequently between the different locations of a busi219.
Id.
220.
See id. at 591 (explaining that the plaintiff’s prima facie case was “eviscerat[ed]” when the district court found that the comparators and plaintiff worked at separate
establishments).
221.
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
222.
Id.
223.
Id. (emphasis added).
224.
29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a) (2012).
225.
Id.
226.
Id.
227.
29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(b) (2012).
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ness; and employment responsibilities that are almost identical at the separate locations.228 If these unusual circumstances are not present, then courts
should apply the general rule that an establishment is a distinct physical
place of business.229
The drafters of the PFA addressed the “establishment” issue and proposed the following language:
[E]mployees shall be deemed to work in the same
establishment if the employees work for the same
employer at workplaces located in the same county
or similar political subdivision of a State. The preceding sentence shall not be construed as limiting
broader applications of the term “establishment”
consistent with rules prescribed or guidance issued
by the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission.230
This portion of this Legislative Note illustrates that the PFA “establishment” amendment could have a substantial impact on how courts interpret
the term “establishment.” In addition, this Legislative Note further recognizes the significance this amendment could have on a plaintiff’s EPA case.
B.

A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM “ESTABLISHMENT”

Despite the general rule, determining when a business qualifies as a
single establishment or separate establishments varies among federal district and appellate courts.231 There are several cases that implement a narrow interpretation of “establishment” and strictly apply the geographical
limitation.232 For example, in Shultz v. Corning Glass Works, defendant
Corning Glass Works operated three different factories.233 The court found
that two of those factories constituted one establishment because the two
factories utilized the same office building and, in addition, were joined by

228.
Id.
229.
Id.
230.
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(C) (2012), 2011 CONG
US S 3220 (Westlaw).
231.
See Brownlee v. Gay and Taylor, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 347, 351 (D. Kan. 1986)
(identifying one line of cases recognizing that “establishment” “is defined as a distinct physical place of business,” and a second line of cases recognizing that an “establishment” can
consist of a business’s different operations in multiple locations).
232.
See Shultz v. Corning Glass Works, 319 F. Supp. 1161 (D.N.Y. 1970). See also
Mitchell v. Birkett, 286 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1961); Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc. 573 F.
Supp. 565 (D. Minn. 1983).
233.
Shultz, 319 F. Supp. at 1164.

244

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

34

passageways.234 However, the court determined that the third factory was a
separate establishment because it was located one-half mile away, “separated from the other two plants,” and employees did not transfer between the
first two factories and the third one.235 Clearly, the PFA language is in direct conflict with the narrow interpretation of “establishment.”236 The drafters intended to eradicate the narrow interpretation used among courts.237
A number of cases favor a broad interpretation of the term “establishment” and stray from the traditional geographic rule.238 Brennan v. Goose
Creek Consolidated School District is an influential case courts look to for
guidance concerning this broad interpretation.239 The court in Brennan
found that thirteen different elementary schools in one school district created a single establishment.240 The court found that a single “establishment”
could apply to a business that has workplaces at different physical locations.241 The court relied on certain factors, which are consistent with the
examples listed by the EEOC,242 to determine whether or not the school
district qualified as a single establishment.243 Specifically, the controlling
factors are centralized “control of job descriptions, salary administration,
and job assignments or functions.”244
The court in Mulhall v. Advance Security, Inc. also deviated from the
traditional rule established by the EEOC.245 Specifically, the court in Mulhall found that the plaintiff could compare her salary to different comparators in Nevada and California because a single establishment existed.246 The
court stated, “[a] reasonable trier of fact could infer that because of centralized control and the functional interrelationship between plaintiff and the
comparators . . . a single establishment exists for purposes of the EPA.”247
Cases like Mulhall and Brennan illustrate that the “establishment” should

234.
Id.
235.
Id.
236.
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(C) (2012), 2011 CONG
US S 3220 (Westlaw).
237.
See id.
238.
See Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994); Brennan v.
Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975); Brownlee v. Gay and
Taylor, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 347 (D. Kan.1986); Grumbine v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 1144
(D.D.C. 1984).
239.
See Renstrom v. Nash Finch Co., 787 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964 (D. Minn. 2011).
240.
See Brennan, 519 F.2d at 54, 58.
241.
Id. at 56.
242.
Id. at 58. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(b) (2012).
243.
Brennan, 519 F.2d at 58.
244.
Brownlee v. Gay and Taylor, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 347, 352 (D. Kan.1986).
245.
Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 591-92 (11th Cir. 1994).
246.
Id. at 588-92.
247.
Id. at 592.
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not be determined solely based on the operation’s location.248 Clearly, this
broad interpretation of “establishment” is exactly what the PFA drafters
intend to promote.249 Not only does the PFA language solidify what initially
constitutes a single establishment, but the PFA language also encourages
broader interpretations that are illustrated in cases like Mulhall and Brennan.250
To reiterate, the plaintiff’s prima facie case almost rests on how a
court defines the term “establishment.” The court may either find the term
should be interpreted broadly or narrowly.251 A court’s choice of a definition is crucial because the characterization of the word can strengthen,
weaken, or, in fact, as one court stated “eviscerat[e]” the plaintiff’s case.252
The analysis below illustrates that the PFA intends to eliminate the negative
consequences that stem from the narrow interpretation of “establishment.”
C.

CONSEQUENCES ELIMINATED FROM A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF
“ESTABLISHMENT”

The PFA “establishment” amendment completely eliminates a narrow,
geographic interpretation of the term “establishment,” and diminishes the
chances of EPA cases being dismissed solely because the court finds the
plaintiff works at a different location and thus may have no comparator in
that location.253 For example, in Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., the plaintiff’s EPA claim was quickly dismissed once the court found that the defendant’s geographically separated offices did not constitute a single establishment.254 The court heavily relied on the fact that “establishment” is defined as a separate place of business.255 Moreover, the court found it was
irrelevant that the operation of plaintiff’s branch was dependent on the other offices.256 In Mitchell v. Birkett, the court found that two photography
shops owned by the same employer were separate establishments simply
248.
See Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 592; Brennan, 519 F.2d at 56, 58; Brownlee, 642 F.
Supp. at 353.
249.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(C) (2012), 2011
CONG US S 3220 (Westlaw).
250.
See id.; Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 586; Brennan, 519 F.2d at 53.
251.
See Brennan, 519 F.2d at 56-58 (illustrating a broad interpretation of the term
“establishment”); Shultz v. Corning Glass Works, 319 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 (D.N.Y. 1970)
(illustrating a narrow interpretation of the term “establishment”), modified sub nom. Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
252.
Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 590-91.
253.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(C) (2012), 2011
CONG US S 3220 (Westlaw).
254.
Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc. 573 F. Supp. 565, 568 (D. Minn. 1983).
255.
Id.
256.
Id.
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because the two enterprises were located nine miles from each other.257 The
court stated that factors like “[c]ommon ownership” and a “close functional
and economic relationship” between the two entities were not satisfactory
reasons to find that the two shops created a single establishment.258 A very
narrow interpretation of the term “establishment” prevents contemplation of
factors that other courts have considered to determine whether a single establishment exists.259
A defendant can easily eliminate a plaintiff’s EPA claim by raising the
“establishment” defense if a court applies a narrow interpretation of “establishment.”260 If the defendant can prove that the “establishment” where the
employee works is a “distinct physical place of business,” the plaintiff’s
EPA case will be dismissed if she has no comparator within that establishment.261 On the contrary, courts that apply the broad interpretation of the
term “establishment” recognize that, when a woman works at a physically
separate location, that is not an indication she should be paid less than a
man.262 In addition, the court in Grumbine v. United States noted it is not
practical for an employer to claim an “establishment” defense (arguing that
an operation is a “distinct physical place of business”) to the EPA when that
employer implements “a uniform, non-geographic pay policy.”263 By eliminating the narrow interpretation of the term “establishment,” a plaintiff’s
case will not be dismissed purely because the defendant limits the plaintiff’s comparators to one location.
Contrary to promoting a broad interpretation of “establishment,” some
courts have noted that Congress did not intend for the “establishment” provision to have a broad interpretation.264 The court in Renstrom v. Nash
Finch Co. maintained that, by the time the EPA was enacted, Congress acquired the term “establishment” from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
and the term had an established definition—“a distinct physical place of
business.”265 Thus, courts have argued that Congress did not intend for the
EPA and the FLSA to provide different interpretations of the term “estab257.
Mitchell v. Birkett, 286 F.2d 474, 477-78 (8th Cir. 1961).
258.
Id.
259.
See Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994); Brennan v.
Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975); Brownlee v. Gay and
Taylor, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 347 (D. Kan.1986).
260.
See Jacobson, 573 F. Supp. at 568.
261.
See Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 591 (explaining that the district court dismissed the
plaintiff’s EPA case because the two male employees the plaintiff intended to compare her
salary to did not work at the same establishment as the plaintiff).
262.
See Grumbine v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 1144, 1150-51 (D.D.C. 1984).
263.
Id. at 1148.
264.
Renstrom v. Nash Finch Co., 787 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964 (D. Minn. 2011).
265.
Id. (citing A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 496 (1945)). See 29
C.F.R. § 1620.9(b) (2012).
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lishment.”266 However, if Congress truly intended for the “establishment”
provision to have a narrow meaning, then many employees would be denied
the remedial value of the EPA.267
D.

PROMOTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE REMEDIAL GOALS OF THE
EQUAL PAY ACT

By eliminating the narrow interpretation of “establishment,” the PFA
drafters promote the “basic purposes” of the EPA.268 Courts that apply a
broad interpretation to the term “establishment” and do not limit it to one
geographic location tend to consider the “basic purposes” of the EPA.269 A
broad interpretation of “establishment” aligns with the EPA because the
EPA is a remedial statute that should be interpreted “liberally.”270 A narrow
interpretation of “establishment” hinders the objectives of the EPA because
a narrow interpretation makes it more difficult to prove that the wage disparity is due to discrimination.271 For example, if a court determines there is
a separate establishment based on geographic location, then it eliminates an
opportunity for the plaintiff to compare her salary to someone who does
substantially the same work at another location.272 By limiting the “establishment” provision to a narrow interpretation, certain employees are completely unprotected by the EPA.273 For example, managerial or professional
employees might have no other employees to compare their salaries with if
the managerial or professional employees are limited to one location.274 In
Vickers v. International Baking Co., the court recognized that limiting the
“establishment” provision to one location “would effectively permit a large
employer with national operations to exempt its managerial staff from . . .
the reach of the EPA.”275 Therefore, the “establishment” amendment actual-

266.
Renstrom, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 964.
267.
See Grumbine v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (D.D.C. 1984).
268.
The basic purposes of the EPA were to promote women’s rights and place
women in an equal economic setting as men. Ultimately, the goal of the EPA was to eliminate any sex discrimination that affected women’s wages in the work place. Grumbine, 586
F. Supp. at 1146.
269.
See id. at 1146. See also Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 519
F.2d 53, 57 (5th Cir. 1975).
270.
See Grumbine, 586 F. Supp. at 1150.
271.
See Brennan, 519 F.2d at 57.
272.
See id. (asserting the consequences from the court’s narrow interpretation of
“establishment” in Shultz v. Corning Glass Works).
273.
See Grumbine, 586 F. Supp. at 1150.
274.
Id.
275.
Vickers v. Int’l Baking Co., No. Civ.A. 398CV1864D, 2000 WL 1804612, at *5
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2000).
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ly promotes and serves the true purposes of the EPA: to promote the economic standing of women in society.276
The PFA “establishment” amendment is significant because, in general, courts shy away from a meaningful application of the broad interpretation of the term “establishment.”277 These courts tend to give significant
weight to the fact that a defendant’s operations are geographically distinct.278 For example, in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the court
found that defendant’s company, which was made up of 130 branch offices,
was an operation that consisted of separate establishments.279 The court
recognized the importance of the test established by Brennan but also
placed significance on “physical proximity as a determinative factor” in
order to conclude that the offices were separate establishments.280 Also, in
Alexander v. University of Michigan-Flint, the court found that the University of Michigan was a separate establishment from University of Michigan-Flint.281 While the two locations were geographically separated, the
plaintiff established that the University itself had “one salary plan and evaluation program,” “one set of job descriptions,” and the like.282 The court,
however, still found the two locations to be separate establishments.283
While the court found the cooperation and communications between the
two locations significant, it also placed emphasis on the fact that the two
locations were physically separated.284 This reasoning differs from courts
that implement the broad interpretation of “establishment” and the PFA
because these sources emphasize that geographic location should not be
considered to determine whether an operation is a single establishment or
separate establishments.285
Contrary to promoting a broad interpretation of “establishment,” if
“establishment” is applied too broadly and courts relax the interpretation of
276.
See generally Grumbine, 586 F. Supp. at 1146 (maintaining that when considering the proper application of “establishment,” the court should acknowledge the “basic purposes” of the EPA, and, as a result, found that the comparators (located at physically separated offices) of the plaintiff were all within the same establishment).
277.
See Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 565, 568 (D. Minn. 1983);
Alexander v. Univ. of Michigan-Flint, 509 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 405 (D. Pa. 1978).
278.
See Jacobson, 573 F. Supp. at 568. See also Alexander, 509 F. Supp. at 629;
Wetzel, 449 F. Supp. at 407.
279.
Wetzel, 449 F. Supp. at 407.
280.
Id.
281.
Alexander, 509 F. Supp. at 629.
282.
Id.
283.
Id.
284.
Id.
285.
See Brownlee v. Gay and Taylor, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 347, 352 (D. Kan.1986);
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012), 2011 CONG US S 3220
(Westlaw).
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“unusual circumstances,” then “any corporation with a hierarchical management structure and a functioning human-resources department would
find itself defined as a single ‘establishment.’”286 However, as the court in
Brownlee v. Gay and Taylor, Inc. stated, “where central supervision exists
and where pay standards apply for an entire business entity regardless of
where the employee is located, individuals should be compared on the basis
of their employment function and not geographic location.”287
V.
A.

A CHANGE FROM COLLECTIVE ACTION TO CLASS ACTION

SECTION 216(B) OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT VERSUS FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23

If a plaintiff wishes to pursue a collective action under the EPA, she is
subject to the standards of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), specifically section 216(b).288 Under a section 216(b) action, the plaintiff essentially
has two requirements to fulfill. First, an action “may be maintained against
any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and
other employees similarly situated.”289 Second, the statute states “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court
in which such action is brought.”290 Essentially, under a section 216(b) collective action, a party plaintiff must affirmatively “opt-in” to the class, and,
in order to do so, she must file a written consent with the court.291 Thus, if a
party plaintiff does not affirmatively join the class, then she does not benefit from the judgment.292
The PFA amends section 216(b) of the FLSA.293 The amendment
states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, any action
brought to enforce the section 6(b) may be maintained as a class action as
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”294 Essentially, the drafters intended to transform the EPA section 216(b) collective action into a
bona fide Rule 23 class action.295
286.
Renstrom v. Nash Finch Co., 787 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 (D. Minn. 2011).
287.
Brownlee, 642 F. Supp. at 352.
288.
Kuhn v. Phila. Elec. Co., 475 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
289.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
290.
Id.
291.
LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975).
292.
See id.
293.
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3220 (Westlaw).
294.
Id.
295.
Id.
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A party who seeks certification under Rule 23 must first meet 23(a)’s
four prerequisites:
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.296
Then, the party must meet one of the three requirements described in Rule
23(b).297 The “opt-in” requirement of section 216(b) is inconsistent with
Rule 23.298 In a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, the court must provide notice to
every individual in the class.299 The notice informs every member of the
class that even if the final judgment is not satisfactory, the judgment “will
include all members of the class who do not request exclusion.”300 In addition, in class actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the judgment
is irrevocable for every member of the class, and there is no option to request exclusion.301 Thus, Rule 23 class actions are known as “opt-out” or
“no option” class actions.302 Persons in a class must affirmatively exclude
themselves from the class, or persons in a class do not have a choice as to
whether they can exclude themselves.303
B.

IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION AMENDMENT

The PFA amendment will create a higher participation rate of plaintiffs in future EPA class actions. Plaintiffs who wish to pursue a collective
action under the EPA and subject themselves to the prerequisites of the
FLSA are faced with the “more restrictive ‘opt-in’ procedure.”304 When
potential plaintiffs must actively join a collective action, there is a lower

296.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), quoted in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2548 (2011).
297.
Id.
298.
Shushan v. Univ. at Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 266 (D. Colo. 1990).
299.
Id. at 265-66.
300.
Id. at 266.
301.
Id.
302.
Id.
303.
Shushan, 132 F.R.D. at 266.
304.
Ameritech Ben. Plan Comm. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 220 F.3d 814, 820
(7th Cir. 2000).
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participation rate.305 The “opt-in” procedure is not favorable to employees
because they fear that if they choose to “opt-in,” they may encounter retaliation from their current employer.306 For example, in Kennedy v. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute & State University, a plaintiff in an EPA collective
action could not affectively pursue a Title VII class action because the
number of plaintiffs did not fulfill the numerosity requirement mandated by
Rule 23.307 The plaintiff contended that current employees feared to join the
collective action.308 Moreover, a court can and will take into consideration
that in employment discrimination cases, the class will be smaller because
employees fear retaliation by their current employer.309 Thus, it is likely
that more plaintiffs will participate in an EPA class action if the “opt-in”
procedure is eliminated.310 In addition, the “opt-in” procedure does not
seem to truly cater to the remedial purposes that the EPA supposedly
serves.311 The “opt-in” requirement limits the employer’s liability to only
those employees who choose to “opt-in.”312 Rather, an employer should be
held liable for all of his wrongful acts towards all of his employees; the
“opt-out” procedure aids in accomplishing this goal.313
Except for the increase in the number of members in an EPA class action, the implementation of the PFA class action amendment would not
otherwise create significant consequences in court proceedings. In order to
certify a class in a section 216(b) case, the court must decide if the plaintiffs
are “similarly situated.”314 Certification of a class under section 216(b) varies among courts315 because section 216(b) is silent concerning the requirements needed to establish when a class is “similarly situated.”316 The
305.
See, e.g., Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural
Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 727, 734
(2010).
306.
See Kennedy v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7-08-cv-00579, 2010
WL 3743642, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2010).
307.
Id.
308.
Id.
309.
See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999).
310.
See Ruan, supra note 305, at 734. See also James M. Fraser, Note, Opt-In Class
Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and ADEA: What Does it Mean to be “Similarly Situated”?,
38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 98 (2004) (demonstrating that plaintiffs are actually discouraged
to join a collective action if they must affirmatively “opt-in”); cf. Kennedy v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7-08-cv-00579, 2010 WL 3743642, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 23,
2010).
311.
See Fraser, supra note 310, at 121.
312.
See id.
313.
Id.
314.
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001).
315.
Rochlin v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. IPoo-1898-CH/K, 2003 WL 21852341, at
*15 (S.D. Ind. Jul. 8, 2003).
316.
See Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102; Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132
F.R.D. 263, 266 (D. Colo. 1990).
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first method used by the courts is known as the ad hoc approach.317 The ad
hoc approach consists of two stages.318 The first stage is known as the “notice stage.”319 If the plaintiffs are “similarly situated,” the court will “conditionally certify” the class and send notice to potential plaintiffs who wish to
“opt-in” to the lawsuit.320 The plaintiffs have a minimal burden and only
have to show that the “class members were together the victims of a single
decision, policy, or plan.”321 At the second stage of the ad hoc method, the
defendant usually files for a motion to decertify the class, and the court
implements a heightened standard to again determine if the plaintiffs are
“similarly situated.”322 The court usually considers the following factors to
determine if a class should survive certification: “(1) disparate factual employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to the defendants that appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and (3)
fairness and procedural considerations.”323
The second approach to determine if a section 216(b) class is “similarly situated” is to integrate the requirements of the Rule 23 class action into
the section 216(b) collective action.324 Courts that apply this approach
acknowledge that Rule 23 is not completely incompatible with section
216(b).325 Under this method, the court applies “Rule 23(a)’s four requirement[s] (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation) and [Rule] 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common questions of fact predominate . . . to determine whether plaintiffs are similarly situated.”326
While these seem like opposite methods in order to determine certification of a class, the two approaches are actually comparable because both
of these approaches “allow for consideration of the same or similar factors.”327 Therefore, the class action amendment does not cause substantial
change to court proceedings because some courts already implement Rule

317.
Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102.
318.
See id. at 1102-03 (describing that the ad hoc approach has an initial “notice
stage” and then the court returns to the issue for a second determination to decide whether
the class is certified).
319.
Id. at 1102.
320.
Mooney v. Aramco Services Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1214 (5th Cir. 1995).
321.
Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo.,
Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (D. Colo. 1996)) (internal quotations omitted).
322.
Id. at 1103; Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214.
323.
Collins v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1344 (N.D. Ala. 2011)
(alteration in original) (quoting Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1261
(11th Cir. 2008)).
324.
Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103.
325.
Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 266 (D. Colo. 1990).
326.
Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo.,
Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (D. Colo. 1996)).
327.
Id. at 1105.
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23 requirements in order to certify section 216(b) classes, and the two procedures are actually quite similar.328
It is recognized that the Rule 23 prerequisites that plaintiffs have to
fulfill for class certification require a “rigorous analysis.”329 One might argue the ad hoc approach is more favorable to plaintiffs because the standard
at the initial stage for conditional certification is quite complaisant.330 However, decertification of a class occurs quite often at the second stage of the
ad hoc approach.331 In the end, both analyses are quite stringent, and, because of this similarity, it is likely that there would not be a significant
change for plaintiffs.332
The procedural standards of Rule 23 better serve the remedial purposes of the EPA than a section 216(b) collective action.333 First, the language
of section 216(b) is vague concerning the requirements needed to establish
a collective action.334 The one established prerequisite is that the class must
be similarly situated,335 and, as demonstrated above, the procedural requirements are established by case law.336 Another significant procedural
difference between Rule 23 and section 216(b) concerns the statute of limitations. Under Rule 23, the statute of limitations is tolled (meaning “to stop
the running of” the statutory period)337 for all class members’ claims once
the class action is filed.338 Thus, once the claim is filed and the statute of
limitations is tolled, the statute of limitations continues to be tolled for every class member “until the motion for class certification is denied.”339 This
differs from a collective action governed by section 216(b). Under section
216(b), the statute of limitations is only tolled for the individual class members who have filed a written consent and “opted in” to the class.340 Plaintiffs who delay to “opt-in” to a collection action are at risk of running out of
328.
See id.
329.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
330.
See Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102; Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207,
1213-14 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that courts often base their decisions to conditionally
certify a class based on pleadings and affidavits submitted to the court).
331.
See Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214; Fraser, supra note 310, at 120.
332.
See Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214; Walmart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
333.
See generally Fraser, supra note 310, at 120-21 (addressing major procedural
differences between Rule 23 and section 216(b) and how these differences can affect substantive rights).
334.
See Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 266 (D. Colo. 1990).
335.
Id.
336.
See Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001); Collins v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Ala. 2011); Rochlin v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. IPoo-1898-CH/K, 2003 WL 21852341 (S.D. Ind. Jul. 8, 2003).
337.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1625 (9th ed. 2009).
338.
See Crown, Cork, & Seal Co., v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983).
339.
Id.
340.
29 U.S.C. § 256 (2006). See Fraser, supra note 310, at 107-08.
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time to file their consents.341 Last, the procedural requirements of Rule 23
are designed to protect the rights of parties who are not present before the
court.342 Some courts argue that the procedural protections of Rule 23 are
only allocated to these individuals because, even though they are not before
the court, they are still “bound by a judgment.”343 Because of this, these
courts argue that “opt-in” plaintiffs do not need the extra protection granted
by Rule 23 because “opt-in” plaintiffs choose to be bound by the judgment.344 However, the court’s duty to protect an individual’s rights should
not be diminished only because it is an individual’s responsibility to file a
written consent so that she may be bound by the judgment.345 Despite the
conflicting views on this subject, the PFA amendment would clearly grant
EPA plaintiffs favorable procedural protections.346
The amendment would create uniformity for plaintiffs who bring both
Title VII and EPA class action claims. “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate with respect to ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ on
the grounds of sex.”347 Claims of “large-scale sexual discrimination” are
frequently brought under both Title VII and the EPA.348 “The same employment situation may give rise to a claim for relief under either statute.”349 It is recognized that the two causes of actions should be interpreted
in accordance with each other.350 Despite this fact, Title VII and the EPA
cannot be analyzed under the same class action procedures.351 In Kuhn v.
Philadelphia Electric Co., the court quickly dismissed the plaintiffs’ contentions to bring an EPA collective action under Rule 23.352 The court noted
that “[m]any courts have held that a suit authorized by §216(b) may not be
conducted as a Rule 23 class action.”353 This is quite different from a Title
341.
See Sari M. Alamuddin et al., Differences Between Rule 23 Class Actions and
FLSA § 216(b) Collective Actions; Tips for Achieving Class and Collective Action Certification Post-Dukes, 890 PRAC. L. INST. 293, 298, 314 (2012).
342.
Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D. Colo. 1990).
343.
See Dolan v. Project Const. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1984), abrogated by Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989).
344.
Shushan, 132 F.R.D. at 267.
345.
Id.
346.
See id.
347.
Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1)).
348.
Thompson, 678 F.2d at 263.
349.
Id.
350.
See Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1975).
351.
Ameritech Ben. Plan Comm. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 220 F.3d 814, 820
(7th Cir. 2000) (“There is no such thing as a Rule 23 class action in an Equal Pay Act
case.”); Kuhn v. Phila. Elec. Co., 475 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. Penn. 1979).
352.
Kuhn, 475 F. Supp. at 326.
353.
Id.
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VII class action claim that is conducted under Rule 23.354 However, the
court recognized that carrying out two different procedural class actions
could create “administrative difficulties” for purposes of the litigation.355
Since one cause of action can give rise to the other,356 it is sensible to create
an amendment that would create uniformity and clarity for future EPA
plaintiffs who wish to pursue a class action.357
One might argue that Rule 23 class actions are actually not a sufficient
procedural tool for EPA plaintiffs, given the recent outcome in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.358 In Dukes, approximately one and a half million
women who were current or former employees of Wal-Mart were certified
as a class.359 However, the United States Supreme Court decertified the
class because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that there was a question
of law or fact common to the class—the commonality requirement mandated by Rule 23(a).360 The Court concluded that the commonality requirement
was not fulfilled because plaintiffs did not sufficiently prove there was a
“companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy.”361 In fact, plaintiffs’ contention that Wal-Mart’s policy of allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters was actually opposite of a uniform policy that would establish commonality.362 However, Justice Ginsburg, dissenting from the majority opinion, found the evidence reviewed by the district court was sufficient to find a common question and fulfilled Rule
23(a)(2)’s requirement.363 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg found that the majority actually combined the criteria of Rule 23(a)(2) with the precedent of
Rule 23(b)(3), a more challenging precedent to satisfy.364 While a critical
analysis of Rule 23 is beyond the scope of this Legislative Note, a close
decision and the apparent controversy concerning the certification of a class

354.
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), for a current interpretation of certifying a class under Title VII pursuant to Rule 23.
355.
Kuhn, 475 F. Supp. at 327.
356.
See Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
357.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3220 (Westlaw).
358.
See Eisenberg, supra note 154, at 270 (cautioning against the use of Rule 23
class actions for EPA plaintiffs given the recent result of Dukes, but arguing only for a modification to section 216(b) and not a change to Rule 23 class actions).
359.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
360.
Id. at 2550, 2551, 2556, 2557.
361.
Id. at 2556.
362.
Id. at 2554.
363.
Id. at 2562-64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
364.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that in addition to
the four prerequisites mandated by Rule 23(a), a Rule 23(b)(3) certification requires that
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members).
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of such massive proportion does not rule out the obvious benefits of a Rule
23 class action in the proposed statute.365
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that the Equal Pay Act was enacted into law almost
fifty years ago, it is clear that the goal for equal wages for women continues
to be only that—a goal. As the statistics clearly indicate, the reality of pay
discrimination continues to permeate throughout society.366 In 1963, a
woman earned fifty-nine cents to a man’s dollar.367 Currently, a woman
earns approximately seventy-seven cents to a man’s dollar.368 If the intent
of Congress was that the EPA would actually eliminate the wage gap between men and women,369 an increase of women’s wages that amounts to
approximately eighteen cents is not a success. Considering that equal pay
for equal work is not actually a reality and still a goal, there needs to be a
solution.
Congress has a solution: the Paycheck Fairness Act. Congressional
members who have fashioned this legislation had similar intent to those
who created the EPA.370 The purpose of the PFA is to actually solve the
wage disparity problem, thus eliminating the wage gap.371 A woman loses
thousands of dollars over a working lifetime because of the wage disparity.372 This financial loss not only affects the economic lives of women, but
those whom they support.373 It is necessary to implement a legislative solution to remedy this wrongdoing.
By analyzing three amendments of the PFA, this Legislative Note
demonstrates the profound legal impact the PFA can have for women who
were or will be victims of unequal pay. The amendment to the “other factor
other than sex” defense will have a significant impact on a plaintiff’s EPA
case.374 First, the PFA amendment would create uniformity among the
courts.375 The circuits are currently split between applying the “gender neutral test” and the “acceptable business reason” standard in order to deter-

365.
See id. See also Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D.
Colo. 1990); Fraser, supra note 310, at 117-22.
366.
See The Wage Gap Over Time, supra note 14; Getz, supra note 107.
367.
See Getz, supra note 107.
368.
See id.
369.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 54, at 39.
370.
See 155 CONG. REC. H129 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009).
371.
Id.
372.
Id.
373.
Id.
374.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-215.
375.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-159.
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mine if the defendant has met his burden of proof.376 The PFA language
clearly supports the “business related” standard.377 Next, because the PFA
adopts the “business related” standard, the amendment would eliminate the
consequences that arise from applying the “gender neutral” standard.378 The
PFA would eradicate a defendant’s ability to avoid liability, because the
amendment does not support a limitless number of factors as long as that
factor does not involve sex.379 Rather, the PFA would create a standard for
the “other factor,” stating that it must be a bona fide factor that is job related and necessary for the business.380 Last, the PFA once and for all would
prevent courts and defendants from utilizing a market force theory to justify
a difference in pay.381 The PFA amendment would eliminate the premise
that women should be paid based on the forces of supply and demand. The
PFA reinforces that women’s wages should be based on their training, education, and skill.382
The PFA amendment to the “establishment” provision would permit
an EPA plaintiff to have a stronger case.383 First, the provision supports a
broad interpretation of the term “establishment.”384 The purpose of a broad
interpretation of “establishment” is to prevent the plaintiff’s prima facie
case from being dismissed solely because the location in which she works
does not have a proper comparator.385 That is, the PFA amendment prevents
dismissal of a plaintiff’s case merely because she is being paid a lower
wage at a different location.386 More importantly, by eliminating a narrow
interpretation of “establishment,” the PFA is furthering the basic purposes
of the EPA.387 A narrow interpretation makes it difficult for the plaintiff to
prove discrimination, and it leaves certain employees unprotected by the
EPA.388 Lastly, the PFA’s amendment compels courts that have been re376.
See Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965 (1992).
377.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3220 (Westlaw).
378.
See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
379.
See supra text accompanying notes 160-183.
380.
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3220 (Westlaw).
381.
See supra text accompanying notes 184-215.
382.
See id.
383.
See supra text accompanying notes 231-287.
384.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3220 (Westlaw); Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 519 F.2d 53, 58 (5th
Cir. 1975).
385.
See Brennan, 519 F.2d at 58; Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 58892 (11th Cir. 1984).
386.
See supra text accompanying notes 253-267.
387.
See supra text accompanying notes 268-287.
388.
See Brennan, 519 F.2d at 57; Grumbine v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 1144,
1151 (D.D.C. 1984).
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sistant to apply a meaningful application of the broad interpretation of “establishment” to actually do so.389
The last amendment analyzed, the “class actions” amendment, would
also have a significant impact for potential EPA plaintiffs.390 The PFA
amendment would allow more employees an opportunity to be part of a
class action.391 In addition, the PFA reinforces the true purposes of the EPA
because Rule 23 grants plaintiffs procedural protections that section 216(b)
does not extend to “opt-in” plaintiffs.392 Last, the amendment would create
uniformity and clarity for plaintiffs who wish to bring both Title VII and
EPA class actions.393 Usually, one cause of action gives rise to the other,
but, unfortunately, plaintiffs must follow two different procedural standards
in one case if they wish to pursue both claims.394 Thus, the PFA would
eliminate the nonsensical procedural hoops plaintiffs have to jump through.
It is obvious that the Paycheck Fairness Act would make significant
changes that female employees deserve. It is also clear that Congress has a
tool that can be used to provide these significant changes that can truly impact women’s lives. It is time for the goal of “equal pay for equal work” to
become a reality.
CATHERINE LERUM*
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